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Climate policy spillovers can be either positive or negative since ﬁrms change their produc-
tion processes in response to climate policies, which may either increase or decrease emissions
of other pollutants. Understanding these ancillary beneﬁts or costs has important implications
for climate policy design, modeling, and beneﬁt-cost analysis. This paper shows how spillovers
can be decomposed into output eﬀects (which have ancillary beneﬁts) and substitution eﬀects
(which may have ancillary beneﬁts or ancillary costs). The ambiguous net eﬀect highlights the
importance of polluters’ responses to climate policy. I then test for climate policy spillovers in
electricity power generation. The estimates are consistent with ancillary beneﬁts from climate
policy arising primarily from reductions in output (primarily at older plants) rather than from
changes in emissions rates.
∗This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference “The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy”
convened in Washington D.C., May 13-14, 2010. Special thanks to Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, Chris Ruhm
and Catherine Wolfram for helpful discussions. Thanks to the University of California Energy Institute (UCEI)
for generous research support during this project. Thanks also to seminar participants at the University of North
Carolina at Greensboro and at UCEI and to Michael Mills for valuable research assistance.
†Send correspondence to: Stephen P. Holland, Dept. of Economics, University of North Carolina, Greensboro,
NC 27402-6165, sphollan@uncg.edu.1 Introduction
Spillovers from climate policy (also known as ancillary beneﬁts or ancillary costs) have important
implications for policy design, modeling, and beneﬁt-cost analysis. Spillovers arise since climate
policy could lead, for example, to a reduction in particulate matter (PM) emissions as well as CO2
emissions. In this case, the ancillary beneﬁts of reduced PM emissions from the policy should be
included in a beneﬁt-cost analysis and may well lead the beneﬁt-cost analysis to recommend more
stringent climate policies. Unfortunately, spillovers can be either positive or negative since ﬁrms
change production processes in response to climate policies, and these changes may lead either to
an increase or decrease in emissions of other pollutants. After presenting a theoretical description
of spillovers from climate policy, this paper empirically tests for and decomposes climate policy
spillovers in electric power generation.
Climate policy spillovers have received attention in the estimation of health beneﬁts from
reduced air pollution. This extensive literature, which is recently surveyed in Bell et al. (2008),
varies considerably in its sophistication with regard to air quality modeling and the responses of
polluters to climate policy.1 For example, Cifuentes et al. (2001) simply assumes climate policy
uniformly reduces pollution across all spatial areas. Other studies use much more sophisticated
air quality modeling to estimate the eﬀects of emissions reductions. Bell et al. conclude that
although the various studies are diﬃcult to compare the results provide “strong evidence” that
the short-term ancillary beneﬁts to public health of climate policy are “substantial.”
Burtraw et al. (2003) focus on the responses to climate policy of electric power generators.2
Using a sophisticated simulation model of electricity supply, the authors show that a carbon tax
would have ancillary health beneﬁts from reduced NOx emissions of about $8 per metric ton of
carbon. Since emissions of SO2 are capped, they note that there are no ancillary health beneﬁts
from SO2 emissions, but they estimate additional beneﬁts from avoided future investment in
emissions control equipment. Groosman et al. (2009) estimate similar eﬀects with a sophisticated
model of pollutant transport.3
1See also European Environment Agency (2004).
2Ancillary beneﬁts have also been studied in transportation, see Walsh (2008) and Mazzi and Dowlatabadi (2007).
3The more conservative estimates in Groosman et al. recognize that emissions of SO2 are capped.Ancillary beneﬁts from climate policy have also been studied in agriculture and forestry
where climate policy could beneﬁt soil quality, wildlife habitat, water quality, and landscape aes-
thetics.4 Finally, ancillary beneﬁts have been estimated to be substantial in developing countries
where regulation of pollutants may be less stringent.5
2 The Theory of Spillovers from Climate Policy
Emissions are generally modeled using one of three equivalent approaches: as an input in the
production process, as a joint product which is a “bad,” or as abatement from some hypothetical
level, e.g., business as usual. The ﬁrst approach has a number of advantages for modeling spillovers
from climate policy since it is readily adaptable to modeling multiple pollutants and allows for
a broad range of substitution possibilities. Moreover, it allows a simple way to model climate
policies, e.g., a carbon tax or cap and trade, as an increase in the price of CO2 emissions (from a
zero price).
In this framework, climate policy spillovers are shifts in input demands in response to an
increase in the price of CO2. Theory shows that input demand may either increase or decrease,
depending on whether the input is a substitute or a complement to CO2. Additionally, the eﬀects
of climate policy can be decomposed into two eﬀects: an output eﬀect, which generally decreases
the demand for all inputs, and a substitution eﬀect, which depends on whether the inputs are net
substitutes or net complements for CO2.6,7 Importantly, demand for pollution inputs that are net
substitutes can still fall with climate policy if the output eﬀect outweighs the substitution eﬀect.8
To illustrate these principles, consider electricity generation which leads to emissions of
SO2 and NOx as well as CO2. Suppose climate policy caused dual fuel generating units to switch
from fuel oil to natural gas. Since natural gas generally has lower sulphur content than fuel oil,
4See Feng et al. (2004), Plantinga and Wu (2003), and Pattanayak et al. (2002). Ebakidze and McCarl (2004) point
out that ancillary beneﬁts must be skeptically considered with agricultural oﬀsets since oﬀset emissions reductions
from other sectors might also have ancillary beneﬁts.
5See Dudek et al. (2003) for analysis of ancillary beneﬁts in Russia; Dessus and O’Connor (2003) for analysis of
Chile; and Joh et al. (2001) for analysis of Korea.
6These eﬀects are equivalent to income and substitution eﬀects from demand theory.
7Deschenes (2011) develops an equivalent framework for labor demand with scale and substitution eﬀects.
8Decomposing responses into output and substitution eﬀects is also useful since output eﬀects may not be eﬀective
for reducing emissions if regulations are incomplete or ﬁrms have market power. See Holland (2009) for further
discussion of output eﬀects with incomplete regulation.
2SO2 and CO2 would be net complements: for a given amount of electricity emissions of SO2 would
be lower in response to climate policy. Since the output eﬀect also serves to reduce SO2 emissions,
climate policy would have ancillary beneﬁts from SO2. Now suppose that climate policy caused
natural gas-ﬁred generating units to increase their combustion temperature, which reduces CO2
emissions but increases NOx emissions. In this case CO2 and NOx would be net substitutes. Note
however, that since the output eﬀect leads to a reduction in NOx emissions, the overall eﬀect may
still be a reduction in NOx emissions from climate policy if the output eﬀect is stronger than the
substitution eﬀect. Thus, climate policy could have ancillary beneﬁts or ancillary costs.
Spillovers are illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of electricity production with emissions
of CO2 and NOx . The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 shows the input demand for CO2. If marginal
productivity is decreasing (the usual case) then the input demand (equivalently the value of the
marginal product) is downward sloping. The ﬁrm would increase use of an input if the value of the
marginal product were greater than the input cost. Thus at the optimum the value of the marginal
product equals the input cost. In the unregulated equilibrium, this marginal product would be
zero and CO2 emissions would be e0
CO2. If climate policy increases the price of CO2 emissions to
tCO2, for example through a carbon cap or tax, then CO2 emissions would fall to e1
CO2.
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the spillovers to NOx emissions from climate policy. In
the absence of climate policy, the NOx input demand is illustrated by the downward sloping solid
line and NOx emissions are e0
NOx. The response of NOx emissions to climate policy depends on
two factors: i)w h e t h e rN O x and CO2 are substitutes or complements and ii) regulations on NOx
emissions. In general NOx and CO2 can be substitutes or complements. If NOx and CO2 are
complements, then climate policy leads to an inward shift in the input demand for NOx , i.e.,
decreases the demand for NOx emissions. On the other hand, if NOx and CO2 are substitutes,
then climate policy increases the demand for NOx emissions.
Whether or not climate policy changes NOx emissions depends crucially on the environ-
mental regulation of the NOx emissions. Two polar cases illustrate the eﬀects: cap and trade in
NOx v. a NOx tax. If NOx is subject to an emissions cap (as in RECLAIM or in the NOx Budget
Program), then climate policy does not change NOx emissions but changes the price of permits in
3the NOx market. For example, if NOx and CO2 are complements, then climate policy decreases
demand for NOx emissions. Since emissions are capped, NOx emissions remain at e0
NOx and there
are no spillover beneﬁts, but the NOx price falls from p0
NOx to p2C
NOx.9
On the other hand, if NOx emissions are subject to price regulation, then NOx emissions
change in response to climate policy. For example, if NOx and CO2 are complements, then climate
policy would decrease demand for NOx emissions and emissions would decrease from e0
NOx to e1C
NOx.




Panel C of Figure1 shows the eﬀect of climatepolicy in the electricity market. Since climate
policy increases the marginal cost of electricity production, the equilibrium price of electricity will
rise from p0
MWh to p1
MWh and the equilibrium production will fall from q0
MWh to q1
MWh.T h i s
output eﬀect will serve to reduce emissions of both CO2 and NOx . Note that the output eﬀect
makes it unlikely that NOx and CO2 would be gross substitutes since the substitution eﬀect
(which increases NOx emissions) would need to outweigh the output eﬀect (which decreases NOx
emissions).
Holland (2010) illustrates the proper valuation of climate policy spillovers for beneﬁt-
cost analysis. Two results are noteworthy. First, spillovers can aﬀect the optimal carbon price.
In particular, if there are ancillary beneﬁts, then the optimal carbon price would be set higher
than the marginal damages. Second, spillovers should be included in beneﬁt-cost analysis just
as other beneﬁts or costs are included. In fact, from a theoretical standpoint, spillovers are
indistinguishable from changes in any other input, such as labor. However, care must be taken to
evaluate environmental spillovers according to their damages since market prices are not available.
Holland (2010) also extends the theoretical analysis in this section by deriving theoretical
predictions. In particular, both the input demand and conditional input demand must be de-
creasing in the own price and output eﬀects must be negative. These predictions will aid in the
identiﬁcation of empirical models.
9Burtraw et al. (2003) note that the falling NOx price may have beneﬁts from avoided future control equipment.
43 Estimation Strategy
Spillovers resulting from responses to climate policy cannot be directly estimated in industries
which are not yet subject to climate policy. Moreover, in industries currently subject to climate
policy, it would be diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of climate policy from the eﬀects of other
environmental regulations.
To overcome these diﬃculties, I exploit the symmetry of input substitution and estimate
t h er e s p o n s eo fC O 2 emissions to the change in the price of NOx emissions.10 This has two
advantages. First, NOx emissions have been regulated extensively so it is possible to design an
estimation strategy with variation in NOx regulations. Second, CO2 was not regulated, so there
is no need to disentangle the eﬀects of the NOx regulation from CO2 regulation. To proxy for
changes in NOx prices, I use changes in attainment status under the CAAAs. Regions that fail
to achieve an ambient air quality standard are deemed to be in nonattainment. Designation as
nonattainment under the CAAAs triggers additional regulations, which vary according to each
state’s implementation plan (SIP).11 In this study, attainment status for 1-hour ozone proxies for
the price of NOx , which is a primary ozone precursor. Since California had multiple changes into
and out of attainment, the analysis focuses on California power plants .
The estimation strategy uses a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. The basic estimating equation is:
ln(Emissit)=βNonattainit + fi + git + νjt +  it (1)
where Emissit is emissions (of NOx ,C O 2,o rS O 2) from generating unit i at time t; Nonattainit
is a dummy variable indicating that unit i is in nonattainment for 1-hour ozone at time t; fi is a
unit-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect; git is a unit-speciﬁc linear trend; νjt is a market-year-month ﬁxed eﬀect
for market j;a n d it is the error term. To correct for possible serial correlation, the error term,
 it, is clustered at the generating unit.
The parameter of interest, β, indicates the response of emissions to a change in attainment
status. Since the nonattainment dummy is a proxy for an increase in the price of NOx emissions,
10Exploiting symmetry requires care since it only holds for marginal changes. See Holland (2010) Appendix 2 for
details on the symmetry of input substitution.
11For detailed descriptions of the regulatory eﬀects of nonattainment designation under the CAAAs, see Greenstone
(2002).
5the estimated coeﬃcient captures the own price eﬀect when NOx emissions is the dependent
variable. With CO2 emissions as the dependent variable, the estimated coeﬃcient captures the
spillover. A positive (negative) coeﬃcient indicates that NOx and CO2 are gross substitutes
(complements). The own and spillover conditional (net) eﬀects can be estimated by controlling
for output in [1], and the output eﬀect can be estimated directly when output is the dependent
variable.12
Most of the potentially confounding variation is controlled for by the ﬁxed eﬀects. The unit-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects capture any diﬀerences in emissions across units due to fuel-mix, generation
technology, generator capacity, installed emissions control equipment, or any other time-invariant
characteristics of the generating units. The unit-speciﬁc linear trends capture any trends at the
unit level, e.g., phasing out of old units. The market-year-month ﬁxed eﬀects are a vector of
indicators for each month of each year for each market, e.g., one indicator is for January 1999 for
the northern California market (NP15) and another indicator is for January 1999 for the southern
market. The market-year-monthﬁxed eﬀects capture all variationover time such as seasonal eﬀects
and changes in relative fuel prices, in labor costs, in capital costs, and in regulations aﬀecting all
generators as well as diﬀerences across the markets. This ﬂexible set of ﬁxed eﬀects captures most
of the potentially confounding eﬀects.
Given this extensive set of nonparametric controls, model identiﬁcation is based on varia-
tion in the attainment status of generating units over time in the sample. Intuitively, the generating
units with unchanged attainment status would serve as controls for the generators with changed
attainment status (the treated group).13 The estimated eﬀect would be biased if there were unob-
served diﬀerential trends in emissions that were correlated with the change in attainment status.
This threat to identiﬁcation is addressed in two ways. First, the multiple changes into and out
of attainment in California diminish the potential for bias from unobserved trends. Second, the
model incorporates unit-speciﬁc linear trends to control for any unit-speciﬁc trends, which would
12By estimating ln(Emissit)=β
cNonattainit + β
MWhln(MWhit)+fi + git + νjt +  it and ln(MWhit)=
β
 Nonattainit + fi + git + νjt +  it in addition to [1], all four derivatives in the Slutsky equation in Holland (2010)
Appendix 2 are estimated separately. However, the identity β = β
MWhβ
  + β
c holds since the sample and all
conditioning variables are identical.
13With change at one time in attainment status, the estimator would be similar to the well-known diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator.
6not be captured by the market-year-month ﬁxed eﬀects.
The estimated spillover eﬀect could also be incorrectly identiﬁed if regulatory authorities
used the additional statutory authority to attempt to reduce emissions of other pollutants. In this
case, changes in attainment status would indicate variations in the prices of both NOx emissions
and other pollutants, and the estimated eﬀect would combine the direct and spillover eﬀects. This
potential confounding is limited by analyzing spillovers on CO2 emissions. During the sample
period, there was still substantive disagreement over whether CO2 was a harmful pollutant and
CO2 was neither listed nor regulated by the EPA as a criteria pollutant. This lack of regulatory
attention to CO2 emissions suggests that the nonattainment indicator is not a proxy for an increase
in the price of CO2 emissions and that the spillover eﬀect is properly identiﬁed.14
Identiﬁcation is supported further by the testable predictions from theory. In particular,
Holland (2010) shows that own price eﬀects are non-positive for both factor demands and condi-
tional factor demands and that output eﬀects are non-positive. A nonpositive estimate of β in [1]
with NOx emissions as the dependent variable is consistent with the theoretical predictions. With
CO2 emissions as the dependent variable, there are no additional testable implications since cross
price eﬀects can be either negative or positive.
4D a t a
This analysis requires data on emissions, generation, attainment status, and other regulations.
Availability of the emissions data limit the sample to the years 1997-2004. Emissions data come
from the hourly U.S. EPA continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) for power plants.
The data are very accurate, include all fossil-fuel ﬁred generators meeting certain requirements,
and have been used in a number of studies.15 The hourly generating-unit-level data are aggregated
to the month for three reasons. First, a number of units report emissions in hours for which they
report no output. Aggregation accurately captures emissions and output while incorporating any
start-up emissions from generating units. Second, if regulations caused a unit to be run fewer
hours, disaggregated data would not capture this reduction with the proportional (log) estimating
14This argument does not hold for SO2 emissions.
15For example, see Puller (2007), Holland and Mansur (2008).
7equations. Aggregation captures the zero production hours. Finally, the data is highly serially
correlated. Aggregation reduces the problem of serial correlation.
Since California had the most variation in attainment status, the primary analysis focuses
on California. Of the twelve counties in California with changes in attainment status, only three
counties have relevant power plants: Contra Costa, San Francisco, and San Diego. After dropping
non-reports and data inconsistencies, the model identiﬁcation is based on changes in attainment
status at 29 of 178 generating units. The data are discussed further in Holland (2010).
5 Estimation Results
The results from estimating equation [1] are presented in Table 1. Each column reports the results
from one of seven regressions. Column (1) reports estimates where ln(NOx) is the dependent
variable, i.e., the NOx factor demand, and columns (3) and (5) capture the factor demands for
CO2 and SO2. Columns (2), (4), and (6) estimate the conditional factor demands since they
control for output, i.e., ln(MWh). Column (7) reports estimates from regressing output on the
same set of controls. Panel B additionally controls for other regulations. Throughout, the unit
ﬁxed eﬀects, unit-speciﬁc linear trends, and market-year-month ﬁxed eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant
but are not reported.
The estimates ofthe three testable implications,in columns (1), (2)and (7), are allnegative.
Thus, the regression results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Moreover these results
show that approximately half of the estimated 40% reduction in NOx emissions can be attributed
to substitution eﬀects with the remainder being attributable to output eﬀects.
The pollutant spillover eﬀects are reported in columns (3)-(6). For CO2, the point esti-
mate indicates that nonattainment designation reduced CO2 emissions by 30%, suggesting gross
complementarity. Controlling for output, the point estimate is very near zero. This suggests that
almost all of the reduction in CO2 emissions can be attributed to output eﬀects. Similarly, the
results for SO2, columns (5) and (6), also indicate gross complementarity almost entirely due to
output eﬀects. The coeﬃcient for the output eﬀect in column (7) estimates a 30% reduction in
output with nonattainment designation.
8The coeﬃcients on output in (2), (4), and (6) imply emissions elasticities for the three
pollutants of 0.8 to 0.9. These estimates are statistically less than one implying that the emissions
rates (emissions per MWh) are declining in output. However, the limited net eﬀects suggest that
the emissions rates do not vary substantially with changes in prices of other environmental inputs,
i.e., pollutant spillovers do not change emissions rates.16
Table 2 splits the sample into old and new plants based on the average age of the plant’s
units. These results show that the reductions in Table 1 come primarily from the reductions in
output and emissions at older plants. Since newer plants are less polluting, they use the NOx
input more eﬃciently and thus did not reduce output in response to the change in attainment
status.
The results are subject to three additional caveats. First, the power of the test is reduced
since electric power generators were likely not the marginal polluter targeted by the change in
attainment status. In particular, the state implementation plans (SIPs) for reducing NOx emis-
sions do not focus on electric power generation. Second, the estimates cannot control for local
economic conditions which may have been correlated with changes in attainment status. Finally,
the symmetry assumption requires care in interpreting the coeﬃcients as spillovers from climate
policy. Although the estimates are valid estimates of spillovers from ozone policy, they are only
locally valid estimates of spillovers from climate policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Spillovers from climate policy are important for policy design, modeling and beneﬁt-cost analysis.
This paper shows that spillovers arise from output eﬀects (which have ancillary beneﬁts) and
substitution eﬀects (which may have ancillary beneﬁts or ancillary costs). The ambiguous net
eﬀect highlights the importance of polluters’ responses to climate policy.
The paper then tests for ancillary beneﬁts from climate policy in electricity power gener-
ation. The estimates are consistent with ancillary beneﬁts from climate policy arising primarily
from reductions in output (primarily at older plants) rather than from changes in emissions rates.
16Holland (2010) presents additional speciﬁcations and robustness tests.
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Figure 1.  Graphical model of spillovers from climate policy. 
 





2 CO e 0
2 CO e







































Table 1: Main Results.  California results for NOx, CO2, and SO2 emissions and 
Megawatt hours. 
 
 ln(NOX)  ln(CO2)  ln(SO2)  ln(MWh)
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Nonattain -0.516**  -0.221* -0.326*  0.003  -0.371** -0.037  -0.365* 
  (0.203) (0.131) (0.190) (0.030) (0.170)  (0.132)  (0.200) 
ln(MWh)  0.809**  0.900**   0.897**  
   (0.016)  (0.010)   (0.013)  
 
Notes: 8,239 monthly observations for 178 generating units.  (8,188 observations for the 
SO2 regressions.)   
Dependent variable is log of emissions or log of MWh of generation.   
Regressions additionally control for market-year-month fixed effects, generating unit 
fixed effects, and generating unit linear trends.  Standard errors clustered at the 
generating unit. 
Controls for other regulations: (CO, NO2, and 8-hour ozone nonattainment and ARP 
NOx Early Election) are not jointly significant in six of the seven regressions.   
** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2: Old and new plants.  California results for NOx, CO2, and SO2 emissions and 
Megawatt hours. 
 
Panel A: Old plants (average start year before 1980).  5,566 observations with 89 units. 
 ln(NOX) ln(CO2) ln(SO2) ln(MWh)
Nonattain -0.715** -0.297* -0.462**  -0.011  -0.325*  0.124  -0.511** 
  (0.230) (0.159) (0.198) (0.020) (0.174) (0.140) (0.222) 
ln(MWh)  0.817**  0.883**  0.887**  
   (0.018)    (0.012)    (0.013)   
 
Panel B: New plants (average start year after 1995).  2,673 observations with 89 units. 
 ln(NOX) ln(CO2) ln(SO2) ln(MWh)
Nonattain 0.154  0.090  0.044  -0.037  -0.536  -0.615*  0.085 
  (0.445) (0.279) (0.507) (0.053) (0.517)  (0.364)  (0.495) 
ln(MWh)   0.754**  0.957**   0.926**   
   (0.037)  (0.022)   (0.030)   
 
Note: Regressions additionally control for other regulations, for market-year-month 
fixed effects, for generating unit fixed effects, and for unit-specific linear trends.   
 